The world’s second oldest profession: the transatlantic spying scandal and its aftermath by Rob Dover (1259040)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
1 
 
 
The World’s Second Oldest Profession: The Transatlantic Spying Scandal and its Aftermath 
 
Robert Dover1 
 
 
“What you have said in the dark will be heard in the daylight, and what you have whispered in the ear in the 
inner rooms will be proclaimed from the roofs”2 From the Gospel of Luke, 12:3. 
 
Be he a fugitive or a whistle-blower, the former National Security Agency analyst Edward Snowden 
has generated a sizeable quantity of commentary and (one can predict) an enduring impact on the 
modern business of intelligence and the communication strategies of governments and non-state based 
adversaries alike. This paper makes two broad claims: 1) it argues that the Snowden’s revelations 
about intrusive intelligence efforts by governments should not mark a fundamental divergence from 
our understanding of these activities prior to his disclosure of sensitive materials. However, in making 
these implied understandings public, Snowden and his media partners have changed the political 
dynamic around mass surveillance and dramatically scaled up public understanding of this area. 2) 
That the revelations both highlight and reflect a tension within several layers of social contract: 
between allied governments and international organisations, and between citizens and their 
governments. The diplomatic relations between the US and European governments will remain 
largely unaffected. The European states loudly complaining about American intelligence are 
themselves full spectrum intelligence actors, and so also engaged in this range of activities. The 
complaints are mostly aimed in three directions: tangential negotiations, such as the EU-US trade 
negotiations (TTIP), in scaling back US efforts for competitive advantage, and to respond to public 
sentiment. The EU institutions are genuinely affronted about intelligence efforts against their 
communications and the revelations may impact on the international trade negotiations, in which data 
protection is now likely to feature and on existing data protection agreements, which the European 
Commission would like to reopen.3 In the realm of public perception of and confidence in security 
and intelligence the Snowden affair will do enduring harm, unless governments can find a way to re-
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establish public support. To provide coverage of these issues this paper is divided broadly into three 
sections: the first checks and challenges the continuity and change points around the NSA (and its 
allies) activities and the observable diplomatic aftermath; the second section explores the impact 
Snowden has had on the social contract, whilst the third and final section summarises where the 
enduring and transient legacies from this affair lie.  
 
Business as usual in the dark corridors 
 
The key argument of this section is that the behaviour that the Snowden information uncovered should 
be neither surprising nor unexpected.4 Furthermore, it can be argued – with a high degree of certainty 
– that the response of a large number of European states to this information was nothing short of 
hypocritical, much as the pan-European response to rendition, or the kidnapping of terrorism suspects, 
was hypocritical some years ago.5 As with rendition a large number of European states had been 
actively complicit in the PRISM program, taking participation far beyond mere acquiescence. But it is 
politically untenable for European governments to be relaxed about the NSA engaging in aggressive 
surveillance of political leaders, even if it was privately well known. The Americans were essentially 
‘outed’, but from a European perspective thankfully by an American, much as they had been in the 
1971 Pentagon Papers scandal, which bears similar characteristics. The repercussions for any non-US 
country if their citizen had been the source would have been severe and enduring. Evidence for this as 
a generalizable assertion comes from the removal of intelligence product from the UK following the 
Klaus Fuchs scandal concerning nuclear technologies6  and the aftermath of the Cambridge Spy Ring, 
and the activities of Kim Philby, in particular7, and from the repercussions for French military 
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intelligence of having provided targeting guidance in Belgrade that transpired to be the Chinese 
Embassy.8 It simply does not pay to embarrass the world’s pre-eminent intelligence nation.  
 
A key element of the Snowden revelations has been to demonstrate the closely interconnected 
workings of the US via the NSA and friendly intelligence services abroad in closely controlling the 
development of mass surveillance techniques. Similarly it has been now shown that these nations (in 
particular Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden) have closely liaised to manoeuvre around 
the spirit of established laws, or the legislators’ intentions for the law via intelligence liaison practice.9 
That liaison mechanisms have been allowed to be used in this way has been overtly or tacitly been 
approved at government level, so it is for political parties to respond to the aggregated pressure from 
their electorates on this issue. Similarly, it had been thought that the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ group, 
established in 1946, had imposed upon itself a rule that stated that each other’s citizens were off-limits 
for surveillance activity, whilst a 2005 amendment moved this understanding to a derogation where it 
is in the national security interests of the primary party. Documents leaked by Snowden to The 
Guardian newspaper in the UK showed that this rule was breached by consent in 2007 by British 
intelligence officials. The memorandum – reprinted in The Guardian newspaper on 20 November 
2013 –stated that:  
 
"Sigint [signals intelligence] policy … and the UK Liaison Office here at NSAW [NSA Washington] worked 
together to come up with a new policy that expands the use of incidentally collected unminimized10 UK data in 
Sigint analysis…The new policy expands the previous memo issued in 2004 that only allowed the unminimizing 
of incidentally collected UK phone numbers for use in analysis..now SID analysts can unminimize all 
incidentally collected UK contact identifiers, including IP and email addresses, fax and cell phone numbers, for 
use in analysis."11  
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10 The term ‘minimize’ in this context means the removal of records from the NSA archive.  
11 Ball, 2013 
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So, whilst the NSA can still not explicitly target a British citizen without a warrant, it may do so if it 
collects the data ‘incidentally’, which means in the course an investigation into a warranted suspect or 
target. As such many British citizens with, for example, Pakistani connections would be caught by the 
‘three hops’ rule, or three degrees of separation, which would capture a significant percentage of a 
target audience with non-UK based contacts (and who themselves could be subject to an 
indiscriminate haul). Thus within the somewhat wide provision of the three degrees of separation 
(where patterns of life or contacts chain analysis is used), a large number of British citizens have had 
their communications data stored and analysed by the NSA, under US rules, with the agreement of 
British intelligence officials.12 This runs somewhat contrary to the statement made by the British 
Foreign Secretary, William Hague on the 10 June 2013, where he stated in Parliament that:  
 
"It has been suggested GCHQ uses our partnership with the United States to get around UK law, obtaining 
information that they cannot legally obtain in the UK. I wish to be absolutely clear that this accusation is 
baseless. Any data obtained by us from the US involving UK nationals is subject to proper UK statutory 
controls and safeguards."13  
 
It is quite difficult to see how this statement tallies with the agreement that Snowden’s leak suggests is 
in place between UK and US intelligence officials, even if only within the spirit of the words spoken.   
 
Political Ownership 
 
One aspect of the internal positioning of the agreements between the UK and US agencies is that is 
not clear is the extent to which British intelligence officials kept their political masters informed of 
the minutiae of this detailing or, as the British Foreign Minister said in answer to questions on this 
very topic that he and the Home Secretary make decisions on this area with the intelligence 
commissioners and thus it remains outside of wider government.14 Such a stove-piping of information 
about issues that have such strong public interest and public policy resonance would seem alien in 
                                                 
12 It should be noted, however, that a 2005 NSA document ‘'Collection, Processing and Dissemination of Allied 
Communications', also noted that it should be possible for the US to spy on the citizens of the Five Eyes nations 
without the permission of those nations, and nor should they be notified that the activity was occurring.  
13 Hague, 2013 
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almost any other area of government activity: the agenda to normalise the understanding of 
intelligence within bureaucratic frames of reference, typified by the work of Peter Gill is placed under 
serious tension by these more recent activities.15 It also raises question-marks over the extent to which 
intelligence activity is even tangentially accountable to the citizenry, which will be addressed at 
greater length later in this essay.  
 
The flow of information about the operational aspects of intelligence policy and a more general flow 
of information around intelligence communities is highly and deliberately constrained, not just in the 
UK but across European capitals. This is partly on the grounds of operational and information 
security, but mostly to provide the widest scope for intelligence officers and assets to operate 
unmolested by adversaries. It is therefore accurate to see intelligence as an exceptional area of 
diplomatic activity where oversight and political control are looser than one might find in almost 
every other area of government activity.16 This works well in terms of having an efficient area of 
activity, but poorly when it comes to a divergence in government and public expectations. European 
publics (and their political masters for that matter) have been shocked and surprised to discover that 
oversight mechanisms can be observed to have been successful and effective, whilst simultaneously 
providing a backdrop to ubiquitous dragnet surveillance.17 Thus it would be wrong to describe 
Parliamentary oversight as having failed, but that systems of oversight had been given underspecified 
powers, particularly in those nations with highly developed capabilities. As such a public discourse 
has emerged where both intelligence and the political oversight of intelligence has become separated 
or disconnected from the publics these agencies serve. For the future efficacy of intelligence activity, 
it is important that this disconnect is quickly bridged, by improved legal powers to question and 
secure evidence and by publishing reports that can be quickly understood by the public in direct form 
(e.g. from Parliamentary web-sources) or via media filters.   
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Diplomatic Antecedents and Impacts  
The focus of attention upon the two leading countries of the ‘Five Eyes’ Group, the UK and US has 
also allowed capable states, such as France, Germany and Spain to complain that these activities have 
been done to them, rather than them being involved in this range of activities, and indeed shaping the 
political and legal landscape to further the reach of these activities. So, for example, in late 2013 
France, Germany and Spain have all summoned their respective US ambassadors to discuss 
surveillance within their borders, whilst in November 2013 the UK ambassador to Germany was 
invited to discuss alleged eavesdropping from the UK embassy in Berlin, an operation which – on the 
face of it – did not look to be particularly sophisticated.18 It is possible to observe a strong resonance 
between the European reaction to PRISM and associated programmes and their reaction to the 
breaking stories around the US policy of so-called ‘rendition’ (or extra-judicial kidnapping) after 
2003.  
 
European states keenly reacted to rendition with horror that a shadow system of prisons and extra-
judicial activity could be in place and active. But it then became clear, in a way that never received a 
similar level of public exposure, that these same European states – and 11 were cited by the European 
Parliament - were at least knowledgably complicit in rendition, and some had been actively 
involved.19 Such complicity ranged from providing overflight rights to the 1245 rendition flights 
identified by the European Parliament, a smaller number of refuelling rights to the small jets 
transporting captives from one facility to another20, through to providing information that had led to 
the original ‘rendering’ or information which allegedly contributed to the questioning-under-duress of 
those captives.21 So, for example, in the case of the Libyan national Sami al-Saadi, the UK 
government paid an out of court settlement to him of £2.5million, whilst not admitting liability in 
                                                 
18 Speigel, 2013 
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20 It found: Italy: 46 stopovers, United Kingdom: 170 stopovers. Germany: 336 stopovers. Spain: 68 stopovers. 
Portugal: 91 stopovers. Ireland: 147 stopovers. Greece: 64 stopovers Cyprus: 57 stopovers. Romania: 21 
stopovers. Poland: 11 stopovers 
21 Muižnieks, 2013 
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answer to his civil action claiming that MI6 (SIS) had been instrumental in his rendition, whilst the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg is waiting to hear cases on what they have described 
as ‘the lawlessness that characterised the CIA [rendition] programme’ that emanate from Germany, 
Poland, Lithuania and Romania.22  
 
The diplomatic impact of the NSA’s activities seem starkest in Germany, France and Spain. The 
allegations that the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel’s personal phone had been intercepted caused 
genuine anger in Germany.23 The American President had somewhat unwisely stated in July 2013 that 
“Here’s one last thing..I’m the end user of this kind of intelligence. And if I want to know what 
Chancellor Merkel is thinking, I will call Chancellor Merkel.”, which seemed to imply – by the time 
the news broke in October - that either he was not telling the truth, or that he was unaware that this 
surveillance was going on.24 Mrs Merkel let it be known that she viewed this activity as ‘a grave 
breach of trust’, and opinion polls both indicated that German public confidence in the US as ally had 
dropped (down some 14% in three months) and that 92% of Germans were in favour of a ‘no-spy’ 
treaty as a result.25 But it was not just from the German government that the Americans received 
diplomatic complaints, the European Union institutions complained bitterly about their offices and 
communications being intercepted, whilst the French President phoned President Obama to complain 
about the revelations in Le Monde that 70.3million incidents of telephone communication had been 
collected in France against French citizens between 10 December 2012, and 8 January 2013 
suggesting a large amount of activity, similarly the American Ambassador was called in to account 
for this level of surveillance.26  Of particularly concern to the French authorities was that the 
surveillance net had been cast far wider than those suspected of terrorist offences of seeking to injure 
American interests: collection was also targeted at the French political and business communities: a 
strong resonance of the pattern of behaviour around ECHELON.   
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So, the key question that emerges from this is the degree to which real disruption to diplomatic flows 
has occurred. It is difficult to measure this in a concretely scientific way, particularly so close to the 
events unfolding. It is possible to judge that there is a degree of positioning and hypocrisy to the 
condemnations: both France and Germany in particular have fully functioning espionage activities, 
and the French are considered to be the most active of the western nations in espionage in the US 
itself. So, strong condemnations are partly for the purposes of counter-espionage: an attempt to 
disrupt US activity. Similarly the condemnation may serve another purpose, so in the case of France, 
President Hollande implied a threat against the comprehensive trade agreement being negotiated 
between the EU and US (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), so part of this 
positioning can be seen as an attempt to reduce the negotiating power of the US. Surveillance done 
against the European institutions will almost inevitably feature on how they approach these 
negotiations too, and the European Commission has stated that it wishes to reopen negotiations on 
data-sharing with the US and to insert ‘anti-snooping measures’ into the TTIP, whilst European 
Parliamentarians called for a suspension of financial data sharing with the US in retaliation.27 So 
across Europe, the reactions to the Snowden revelations are in line with general dispositions towards 
the US, save for Germany who responded with greater anger than could have been predicted in July 
2013.  
Comforting the Enemy? 
A strong part of the official discourse surrounding the Snowden leaks was that they firstly gave 
‘comfort to the enemy’, and it was on this basis that the some in the US wanted Snowden extradited 
back to the US, and secondly, that the revelations around US tactics and capabilities would give 
current and future belligerents a competitive advantage.28 Of all the things said about these leaks, 
these are the least persuasive. Those involved in serious activities against western interests would 
already be acutely aware about the insecurity of electronic communications and data trails, this is why 
Jihadists at various stages in during the 2000s switched to small, cellular structures, away from 
telecommunications, to voice-over-internet-protocol communications, to ‘burner phones’, and satellite 
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28 Keller, 2013 
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phones, from electronic money transfers and bank-holdings to cash-passed-on in person and in the 
case of bin Laden to accommodation with high walls, and cloth drapes for outside shade to evade 
overhead surveillance – no longer out in the wilderness but conspicuously in the suburbs, just away 
from the prying overhead eye. So, those engaged in these activities in a serious way would already 
have been avoiding (as far as they could) the techniques being deployed by the US and allies. Those 
self-radicalising or partaking in less well planned activities might have gained some kind of additional 
wisdom, but the actual risk or threat posed by these actors is difficult to assess and is likely to be 
small.  
 
The invocation of ‘giving comfort to the enemy’ is geared more towards its public relations impact: 
the positioning of Snowden as a whistle-blower and to some a heroic sacrificial figure was addressed 
– in part- by seeking to appeal to patriotic sentiment: ‘comfort to the enemy’ is constructing Snowden 
as them, helping them, against the interests of us. That the them might be better equipped to strike us 
is a strengthened version of the same rhetorical device. That a significant proportion of publics across 
North America and Europe viewed the NSA’s activities as being targeted at them has reduced the 
usual traction such a message would have received. The other example of where such rhetoric was 
used was in the 1971 Pentagon Papers scandal, where Daniel Ellsberg photocopied the secret internal 
review papers of the Vietnam conflict and delivered them to the New York Times and the Washington 
Post because he felt the US government had lied to the public about the purpose and conduct of the 
war. Ellsberg and Snowden were similar in their tactic of using multiple news agencies to disseminate 
their leaks thus reducing the prospect of suppression, as had been tried in the case of the Pentagon 
Papers.29 They were also similar in passing on primary evidence to these news organisations: Ellsberg 
with Xeroxed copies, Snowden with digital copies but to the same effect.30 Similarly with both the 
Ellsberg and Snowden leaks only a tiny proportion of this material it into the public realm, and thus 
both are of a different character to the Wikileaks Cablegate episode, but arguably both have had a far 
more significant impact.  
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‘If you’ve got nothing to hide…’: the transformation in the social contract 
 
The main argument of this section is that the activities of the large and capable intelligence 
organisations in the developed world, and particularly the NSA and GCHQ, have had the impact of 
perturbing the diplomatic system in the short-term, but that for the ordinary public these revelations 
have the capacity to drive a larger wedge between the governmental elites and the populous.  
 
In his interview evidence to The Guardian newspaper Edward Snowden said the following (and this 
provides the principle driver for his actions in leaking the material):  
 
‘Even if you’re not doing anything wrong you’re being watched and recorded… The storage capability of these 
systems increases every year consistently by orders of magnitude to where it’s getting to the point – you don’t 
have to have done anything wrong. You simply have to eventually fall under suspicion from somebody, even by 
a wrong call. And then they can use this system to go back in time and scrutinize every decision you’ve ever 
made, every friend you’ve ever discussed something with. And attack you on that basis to sort of derive 
suspicion from an innocent life paint anyone in the context of a wrongdoer’.31  
 
This is the logic of the panoptican and within popular political discourse it is the logic of totalitarian 
states that the democratic world are said to oppose. It is within this central irony of democratic states 
adopting the tools and methods of autocracy to protect freedom that the core political problem 
appears, and within two main modes of transmission: 1) a simple political divergence that is based on 
a failure of expectations e.g. we thought that the core values of these services were x, and they appear 
to be y, and 2) a psychological process that is akin to criminalisation, by which I mean that observable 
process by which individuals become desensitised to certain types of criminal activity. The most 
obvious ‘benign’ examples are paying for services in cash to avoid taxation, or downloading music 
from peer-to-peer websites, or being fined for automotive speeding. The ubiquity of these activities 
gradually places the individual outside of the frame of certain laws – which have uneven patterns of 
enforcement – and eventually blurs the line between those who are law-abiding and those who hold a 
‘pragmatic’ view of the sanctity of the law.32 A similar phenomenon can be seen to be emerging with 
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reference to intelligence agencies. Part of the observation is analogous, and is captured by 
communities using alternative internet services – those using ‘Tor’ (an online anonymity service 
established in 2002, that was partly funded by US government monies in its initial phase) - which 
allows users to evade the normal surveillance over their internet activities.33 Typical users are those in 
sensitive professions (journalists, military personnel and business people) as well as those which an 
NSA official recently called ‘very naughty’, by which he meant a criminal element.34 The debate in 
the UK around Tor and services using the Tor architecture has focussed in on the ‘naughty’ elements 
of it, as an alleged permissive environment for child pornographers, drug smugglers and others intent 
on criminal activity.35 The shaping of political discourse around Tor that if there is not unfettered 
access for security officials to it that ‘bad things will happen’ misses out on the reality that criminals 
are good at adopting multiple, fluid identities with or without Tor, and that the Tor services are used 
by legitimate users seeking internet anonymity, up to and including dissidents in developing world 
countries whom America and their European allies support. The official response to Tor is 
informative though: it is an ungovernable cyber-space generating a large amount of anxiety in security 
and political circles (and we learn particularly the NSA), resulting in a strong dominant discourse 
around deviance.36 If one was to poll those who had read media coverage of the Tor service, one 
would assume that it was essentially criminal in character. This is a clear attempt to shape politics, 
and to curtail certain kinds of lawful activities and speech-acts, but it should be noted that those using 
Tor and related services have rapidly increased since July 2013 suggesting there is a strong demand 
for these kind of services currently. 
 
The One Percent Doctrine and Electoral Disillusionment 
 
The attempts to unveil the identities of Tor users, and to survey their activities also points to a 
continuation of the famous 1% doctrine (also known as the Cheney Doctrine), whereby government 
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action was deemed justified if there was just a 1% chance of a threat being realised: the emphasis was 
on the response rather than the threat.37 The impact on the public of the 1% doctrine, or variations of 
it, is that rather than being protected by government agencies, the public are the object of their 
attentions and that shift in emphasis is crucial in understanding a recasting a the social contract 
between state and citizenry. In a British context this is simply expressed in using an imperial and post-
imperial frame of reference: we are happy that security measures are taken against them, in order to 
protect us. But if we run the same basic sentence and premise under what we know post-Snowden it 
becomes ‘security measures are taken against us and them, in order to protect us from them. The 
astute reader will see that the definitional clarity of the first sentence (even if socially constructed) is 
lost in the second sentence where the distinction between us and them is entirely merged. There is 
thus the potential for an uneasy, or unintentionally aligned coalition of us and them to emerge which 
sees security and intelligence efforts in an adversarial guise. Such a coalition, if allowed to persist, 
would put the fundamental social contract of the public offering up their unfettered freedom of action 
for a security guarantee from the state under question.  
 
The creation of an adversarial relationship to emerge between intelligence agencies and the citizenry 
are not emerging in a vacuum, however, it is more worryingly replicated in the drift away from 
mainstream political processes and towards the politics of protest and radicalism. Classically, this was 
typified by a soft-correlation between the reduction in popular participation in political parties, and 
election turnout and an increase in participation in interest groups.38 More recently, and particularly 
since the economic crisis of 2007-8 this has dovetailed with the emergence of consistent opinion poll 
data suggesting a disillusionment with the political establishment as a class or activity, in line with 
corporate financiers as being part of a coupled elite.39 Put more simply, there is growing trend to think 
that these elites are ‘nothing to do with us’, and ‘do not work in our interests’. There are many 
possible responses governments could take to this, including out-reach efforts and efforts in 
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transparency. The most productive route for governments will be mild reform, including more overt 
and publicised oversight mechanisms and an elongated period of time without adverse publicity.  
 
An unchallenged past? Echoes of ECHELON 
 
The revelations around the ECHELON programme, first brought to light by the investigative 
journalist Duncan Campbell in 1988, via a former employee at the UK’s main listening station 
Menwith Hill, brings further weight to the argument that the real transformation from the Snowden 
leak is the switch from targeted intrusive surveillance to ubiquitous or dragnet surveillance that moves 
us into being part of them.40 ECHELON was an electronic and signals interception programme, with 
global reach, run by the Five Eyes members, the data from which was analysed, stored in, and 
disseminated from the NSA.41 The ECHELON system intercepted communications from the two 
main communications satellites (Intelsat and Inmarsat), through which public, business and 
government telephone calls and fax messages were communicated when triggered by particular 
words, names or other search terms. As William Studeman noted in 1992, as a former NSA Director 
speaking to an Open Source intelligence conference about the amount of useful intelligence gathered 
in this way:  
“One intelligence collection system alone can generate a million inputs per half hour; filters throw away all but 
6500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are normally selected by analysts and only 
one report is produced. These are routine statistics for a number of intelligence collection and analysis systems 
which collect technical intelligence".42  
In a direct echo to the Snowden papers and PRISM the defence of ECHELON was that it did not 
intercept a particular target’s communications, more that if focussed on target phrases and patterns 
and thus individuals were identified as a by-product of those sifts. The defence of PRISM is that it 
collects meta-data, from which targets may be selected for closer attention or that the meta-data is 
sifted once a target has been identified. ECHELON did not attract the public attention that Snowden 
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41 Webb, 2008 
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and PRISM has. This may be – in part – to the reliance at the time on print, radio and non-24 hour 
rolling news outputs for dissemination of such messages. An analogue era compared to the ubiquity of 
social media and internet delivered news content today, but a more likely explanation is likely to be 
the successful rebuttal of the notion of that ECHELON targeted the ordinary citizen on a wide-scale.  
The most active organisation in Europe on the question and danger of ECHELON was the European 
Parliament, who were particularly concerned about the potential advantages American trading 
interests were gaining via intercepts of the positioning, commercial manoeuvres and negotiations of 
European business interests. European Parliamentarians returned home from a fact-finding mission to 
the US early in 1999 when American government officials maintained the official line that 
ECHELON did not exist, and two of the stronger research papers on ECHELON were commissioned 
by the European Parliament and were written by Duncan Campbell, who had originally broken the 
story, and Dick Holdsworth who was the first to point out the economic espionage possibilities from 
NSA stations in Europe.43 The marginalised position of the European Parliament, prior to the Lisbon 
reforms, was a hindrance to the widening of opposition to invasive surveillance techniques and 
practices at the time, and may have contributed to a sense amongst American security officials that 
there was little in the way of significant opposition to them expanding these activities. It should also 
be remembered that the Europeanisation of security and defence (whilst by no means fully developed 
now) was almost totally absent in 1999 and 2000, and so was a competency that was vested in 
Member Governments, some of whom were involved in the delivery of ECHELON, whilst others 
were passive landlords to collecting stations: there was little appetite at a state level to generate 
adverse commentary about this programme.   
 
Summary remarks: ‘A lot of rhetoric and positioning, but some real damage too’  
 
                                                 
43 Campbell, "Interception Capabilities 2000", 1999 & Holdsworth, 1999 
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From an area of government activity that had been largely anonymous prior to 2001, ‘the hidden 
wiring’ of governments as Peter Hennessy famously called it, intelligence has been a constant 
presence in all forms of news media and popular culture since.44  The aftermath of the 2013 Snowden 
revelations have amplified intelligence as a prominent government function even further. Writing in 
the immediate aftermath of Snowden it would be easy to be seduced by the acres of lurid media 
reportage and analysis on the topic: intelligence studies, and its parent disciplines have a duty and a 
role to distil the frenzy45, to assess where the best truths lie. And my summary assessments of the 
impact on our politics of the Snowden revelations are as follows:  
 
The magnitude of the American collection programme – in terms of the volume of data it is capturing 
and the ubiquity of the trawl – is confirmation of something suspected by intelligence scholars and 
intelligence campaigners alike. The final chapter of Richard Aldrich’s excellent book on the UK 
collection agency GCHQ is a good example of where this thinking was prior to Snowden.46 However, 
whilst it can be said that this situation was anticipated, predicted or analysed to be the case, there was 
little in the way of public understanding. This understanding amongst publics has now permeated 
across the entire Atlantic area (the EU, North and Latin America, Euro-Med, West and Southern 
Africa) and across the Pacific, with some serious moments of clear public dissent about it. For the 
governments of those countries – and in different mixes – they will need to formulate responses that 
adequately address the concerns of their citizens.  
 
There has been a great deal made by European governments about the NSA programmes, notable 
targets, and in particular where they have targeted European citizens. That this activity was happening 
would not have been a surprise to European governments, particularly as a good number of them were 
complicit in the American programme or peripheral European variants. And so the positioning here is 
in part political necessity, it simply is not possible for a government to say that it is relaxed about a 
third party engaging in widespread surveillance of its citizens. For those governments not directly 
                                                 
44 Hennessy, 1996 & Dover & Goodman, 2009 
45 Echoing the title of another Peter Hennessy title (2013)  
46 Aldrich, 2011 
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involved in the programmes it is a permissive and appropriate moment for them to voice their 
concerns or opposition to the activities taking place. And for those governments involved it was an 
opportunity for them to try and show points of difference and to highlight American activity with the 
aim of shielding their own well developed programmes from the glare of attention. The complaints 
from the EU institutions about intrusive surveillance into their operations seem genuinely felt 
however, and there is likely to be changes operating procedure here to try and bolster cyber-security.  
 
The bugging of German Chancellor Merkel’s phone caused genuine anger and revulsion in Germany. 
The official American line that President Obama was unaware of this activity against one of his most 
important European allies gave the impression that either the NSA had gone rogue or the President 
had not been informed of this highly sensitive activity: either option is as unpalatable as the other. The 
exceptionalism of the activities against Merkel only lie in the fact that she was such a close ally and 
diplomatic partner of Obama’s, the interception of political leaders’ communications is routine, and – 
for example in an analogous example - British intelligence officers were revealed to have bugged the 
UN Secretary General’s office in 2002-3 in the run-up to the Iraq war, showing that the requirement 
for information sometimes usurps diplomatic conventions and practice.47 Obama’s response to the 
crisis has crystallised in the early part of 2014, with a defence of the work of the NSA, and a pledge to 
enact any reform of the NSA and its work, including on what activities require warrants through 
Congress.48 Such reforms do, therefore, seem highly unlikely to be radical, and thus those 
international partners affected by NSA activities will need to respond to these activities as they see fit.  
 
Building upon President Obama’s embarrassment regarding Chancellor Merkel, the Snowden episode 
has brought into stark relief the reality that the technical capacity and capabilities of developed world 
intelligence agencies have outpaced the legal frameworks within which they operate and the political 
oversight mechanisms that are meant to unsure appropriate tasking and political accountability. If it is 
true that the NSA focused in on Merkel’s phone without the highest level authorisation then the 
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process by which approval is sought is deficient. Similarly in the UK the Parliamentary oversight 
committee was seen to be ineffective and indeed supine in forewarning the three intelligence directors 
of their questions in advance49 and the Foreign and Home Secretaries had decided not to further 
disseminate their decisions regarding the surveillance of UK nationals by outside agencies wider in 
government.50 A disconnect between the intelligence agencies, and politicians on one hand can be 
seen to have widened as capacity and capabilities have grown: a level of autonomy exists for 
intelligence agencies that are unprecedented. But a critically important disconnect also exists between 
intelligence agencies and the political classes on one side and the ordinary public on the other. Such a 
disconnect goes to the very heart of legitimacy in Parliamentary democracies.  
 
One important aspect of the official shaping of the consequences of the Snowden revelation 
concerned the advantage that had been given to adversaries, who were now able to shape their 
communications strategies to avoid the attentions of the NSA and associated allies.51 Given the 
multifaceted relationship between the allied security forces (be they military or intelligence) and 
various Iraqi, Afghan and jihadist adversaries where each side has adapted to the others 
developments, approaches and tactics it seems unlikely in the extreme that all bar the least 
sophisticated of belligerent actors would have viewed electronic communications as being a safe 
means by which to communicate prior to the Snowden material. To suggest that Snowden has 
radically altered the operating basis for terrorist groups would seem to be disingenuous.  
 
An enduring impact of this Snowden imbroglio might well become the design and architecture of the 
internet itself: a move which would be opportunistic rather than one of necessity. US design and 
control over the fundamental architecture of the internet (naming and address location) has been a live 
issue for the last five years at least. Knowledge that the NSA and allies have been tapping into the 
core infrastructure to intercept traffic in transit has produced considerable quantities of analysis 
around whether an alternative architectural design is desirable: such a move, instigated by Chinese or 
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Russian authorities would significantly raise the transaction costs for US in collecting this material. 
Whilst naming and addressing is one element of the infrastructure of the internet, physical cabling is 
the other, and in response to allegations that the NSA has inserted physical intercepts into the 
submarine cables a number of states have suggested that they will invest in their own cabling to 
protect their communications. The most credible of these come from Brazil and Germany. In February 
2014, and in the light of a reported decision to abandon attempts at a ‘no-spy’ deal with the US, 
Chancellor Merkel suggested that she would seek support for a European communications network, 
so that electronic traffic no longer needed to transit through American servers (Deutsche Telekom has 
proposed its own similar system too). In reality this piece of populism will only be opposed by the 
most Atlanticist of nations in Europe.52 In security terms, it now makes clear sense for European 
governments to be more pro-active in securing communications data, but it is more of a question of 
how this is achieved, with some – including Edward Snowden in subsequent interviews - arguing that 
it can only be done so by international agreement.53 Some of this international brokerage has been 
done within the UN, which pre-Snowden had been focussing on the alleged Chinese government theft 
of developed world intellectual property, and which the United States was keen to remain the focus 
post-Snowden too. The resolutions made at the end of 2013 within the UN General Assembly were 
passed without the need for a vote and sought to reaffirm principles of individual privacy and 
international agreement, so there may be avenues here that can be exploited by governments.54  
 
In its response to the revelations about the extent of NSA surveillance on Brazilian communications, 
the Brazilian government has proposed in draft form a requirement for all Brazilian data to be held in 
Brazil, advanced quantum cryptography and its own submarine data cabling.55 Critics have described 
these moves as the Balkanization of the internet, and unless the Brazilian government subsidises data-
warehousing within its borders, these measures will add a significant market barrier to technology 
companies and e-commerce in Brazil. Additionally, a substantial and underplayed aspect of this whole 
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issue is the considerable market share in network devices designed and manufactured in China, with 
several of the ‘Five Eyes’ nations banning the installation of Chinese made devices for fear of 
deliberately designed flaws to allow vulnerabilities to be exploited by Chinese intelligence 
operatives.56 Similarly, the existing internet architecture is said to be vulnerable to wholesale Chinese 
interception: the NSA scandal may just be the one we have learned about.57     
 
Former US Secretary of War Henry Stimson once famously said, “Gentlemen do not read each other's 
mail”. The Cold War taught us to focus in on confronting threats that emanated from within and 
without. Post-9/11, these Cold War techniques, coupled from the threat from Jihadism have 
crystallised to remove the governmental taboos around individual privacy. As a consequence this has 
become no era for gentlemen.   
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